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ABSTRACT 
 
The Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 not only introduced the term of corporate governance 
but also drew attention of the public about the weaknesses of Malaysian corporate 
governance practice. After 1998, Malaysian government decided to adopt corporate 
reform that could enhance the quality of good corporate management practice. This 
reform is clearly stated in the code and rules of corporate governance. The purpose of 
this research is to study the significance of implementing the code and rules of corporate 
governance since the public already realize the close relationship between business and 
politics. Three companies were chosen as indicators for this study. As a result, it was 
found that companies which are involved in corporate malpractice but have good 
relationship with states will always be excluded from the legal corporate action.      
 
Keywords: corporate governance, corporate reforms, political economy, state business 
relation 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 not only introduced the term of corporate 
governance but also drew attention of the public about the weaknesses of 
Malaysian corporate governance practice. After 1998, Malaysian government 
decided to adopt corporate reforms that could enhance the quality of good 
corporate management practice. This included the introduction of the new 
Malaysian code and rules for corporate governance. The debate of corporate 
governance in Malaysia are often limited to agencies involved directly in law 
enforcement such as the Ministry of Finance, Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
(KLSE),1 Securities Commission (SC) and Registrar of Company.   
 
On contrary, the aim of this paper is to study the significance of implementing 
the code and rules of corporate governance from the political economy 
                                                 
1 Recently known as Bursa Malaysia. 
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perspective.2 In Malaysia, the close relationship between the business and 
politics is no longer a secret (Gomez, 1990, 1994). This is further evidenced by 
firms which are wholly-owned and controlled by the ruling parties. This 
phenomenon leads to a question on whether these companies will face any 
corporate legal action should they fail to comply with any of the code and rules 
pertaining to corporate governance.  
 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
This is an exploratory study which uses qualitative research methodology.  This 
research extensively uses secondary data from various past researches, economic 
reports, company annual reports as well as articles from journals, working papers 
and books. Case study method has also been applied in this research in order to 
answer the assumption made by the researcher. The focus of this research is 
solely on links between state and capital.  Hence, a case study was carried out on 
three politically linked business companies, namely Perwaja Steel Sdn. Bhd., 
Renong Bhd. and Malaysia Airlines System Bhd. (MAS).  This is the first study 
of its kind in Malaysia which compares three infamous corporate malpractice 
cases.   
 
Further analyses were carried out using the Basic "Black Box" Model of 
Corporation by Blair (1995), which explains how the elements of the corporate 
governance function. According to Blair, a corporation is unique because there is 
a substantial part of economic activity.  Corporations are legal structures and their 
existence is not limited in time or space. As separate legal entities, corporations 
are distinct from any individuals who participate in them. They can own property 
and business asset in terms of land, building, equipment and intangible assets 
such as patents or brand names. Corporations can hire or contract work of 
millions of individual and thousands of corporation to create more wealth.  Thus, 
corporations have to perform efficiently. Otherwise, their cost will be too high 
and they might be out of business. If corporations default on their debt, they will 
be unable to secure fresh loan or ended up paying high interest rate to 
compensate credit risk. Such phenomenon will lead to a big impact on the 
economic and government performance. On this note, corporate governance is 
definitely needed to control various participants in corporate enterprise. But, 
Blair did argue that the success of corporate governance enforcement is restricted 
on how much government intervenes in the economy. 
 
                                                 
2  The concept of political economy here refers to political business which analyses the evolving 
links between politicians and large scale enterprises with emphasis given to the changing pattern 
of ownership and control ties among politically well-connected companies. 
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Based on Blair (1995) , this research attempts to answer the following 
assumption: "Companies, which have good relationship with states will always 
be excluded from penalty under the rules and code of corporate governance." 
 
The basis for this assumption also refers to Malaysia 's  long history of close 
political-business links in various forms (Gomez, 1990, 1994, 2002).  In this 
regard, we refer to first, ruling parties owned companies. Second, corporate 
figures who have strong political networking and owned firms that once belonged 
to government which eventually re-nationalized and lastly, the government 
owned firms through state investment arms.    
 
 
THE CONCEPT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
 
The phrase "corporate governance" is often used but yet lacks a precise definition 
(Low, 2000: 436).  Most of the definitions focused on the structure and the 
function of the board of directors or the rights and prerogatives of any 
shareholders in boardroom decision making. The High Level Finance Committee 
Report3 on Corporate Governance in Malaysia also defined corporate governance 
from the same perspective. They defined corporate governance as "the process 
and structure used to direct and manage the business and affairs of the company 
towards enhancing business prosperity and corporate accountability with the 
ultimate objective of realizing long-term shareholder value whilst taking into 
account the interest of other stakeholders" (Lee, 2003: 41). 
 
From the definition, corporate governance mainly focuses on the process used to 
direct and manage the business and affairs of the company with the objectives of 
striking a balance on:  
 
· The attainment of the company's objectives. 
· The alignment of corporate behavior to meet the expectations of 
shareholders. 
· Accountability and good stewardship, taking into consideration the 
interests of shareholders, stakeholders, corporate participants and society at 
large. 
 
                                                 
3 The committee comprises the Ministry of Finance, the SC, the Companies Commission of 
Malaysia, the Financial Reporting Foundation, The Malaysian Accounting Standards Boards, 
Bank Negara Malaysia, Association of Bank Malaysia, The Association of Merchant Banks 
Malaysia, KLSE, The Association of Stock Broking Companies Malaysia, The Malaysian 
Association of the Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administration and the Federation of 
Public Listed Companies.  
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Thus, corporate governance can be described as the proper procedure on how the 
"government" of a company (the managers and board of directors), should be 
responsible to their "voters" (the shareholders, creditors and investors). Corporate 
governance emphasized on the transparency of decision making process, fairness 
and trustworthiness in managing a company. However, Blair (1995) viewed the 
definition and concept of corporate governance from a wider perspective but at 
the same time still emphasized on the ownership and control element as 
suggested by Cadbury (1992), Monks and Minow (1995) 4 and The High Level 
Finance Committee Report for Blair, the degree of good enforcement of 
corporate governance very much depended on the roles of the state.   
 
 
THEORETICAL MODEL 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the basic model of corporation. Corporations are organized 
and run by entrepreneurs or a management team that raise funds to acquire 
physical capital and to finance initial operation by borrowing from banks and 
other lenders (debts) or by issuing and selling "equity" shares. The decision made 
in the boardroom will directly affect the shareholders and financial institution 
while indirectly affect the employees, suppliers and customers.  The board of 
directors has the responsibility of making the right decision that should directly 
or indirectly benefit all parties involved.  Meanwhile, the concepts of ownership 
and control are important to ensure the company practices check and balance 
system between the owner and the company's management. The owner of the 
company or the shareholders has the rights to obtain accurate information which 
will enable them to be comfortable with the company's operation and be sure on 
return of their investment. They also have the rights to offer their opinion and 
suggestion to the company's management in improving certain actions that need 
to be taken by the company's management, or object upon any decis ion, which 
they believe as inappropriate or unprofitable to the company. The directors of the 
companies have to prove their abilities in making the right decisions especially 
decision related to investment and loan in order to preserve the interest of 
shareholders and other stakeholders. 
 
Eventhough the corporate governance recognized the rights and power of the 
shareholders and director as the shareholder's proxy, the rights and power are still 
subjected to the law regulated by the government (Blair, 1995). This means that 
the actual rights and power of the principal and its agent in the company's 
                                                 
4  The concept of ownership and control is to establish an internal management system in a 
company to avoid misuse of resources and fraud.  The boards of directors and shareholders of 
company play an important role in determining the company's direction.  At the same time, the 
balance of interest of all individual, company and society were done to encourage and develop 
investment opportunities, which benefit all parties involved.  See Nor Azizah (2004: 32–37). 
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management is very much dependent on how much the state intervenes in the 
economy. In this case, Blair concluded that the state is the actual company 
controller compared to policy or law regulated under the rules and code of 
corporate governance.  Financial institutions also play an important role in the 
enforcement of the corporate governance. The stability of the financial institution 
will also lead to company's stability. However, the problem arises when the 
financial institution is also owned by the state. As the owner, the state is enabled 
to control the company through the financial policy besides the rules and 
corporate laws.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
        
           
     
                                  
 
                       
 
 
                                                          
                     
             
                                                                         
   
 
Figure 1. Basic "Black Box" Model of Corporation 
 
Source:  Blair (1995: 21) 
 
 
RESEARCH ANALYSIS 
 
Corporate Reforms and Achievements  
 
The Asian Financial Cris is led government to adopt corporate reforms. Since 
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order to improve the level of corporate governance in the country.  In 1999, under 
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Governance was formed. The committee was given the responsibility to review 
the corporate framework and make recommendations to improve the level of 
corporate governance in the country. The committee felt that there were serious 
corporate governance weaknesses particularly in the following areas – 
transparency and disclosure requirement, corporate monitoring responsibilities 
and accountability of company directors including the rights of minority 
shareholders (Das, 2000: 19). Therefore, the code of corporate governance, which 
included the principles and best practices in the corporate governance, were 
established for the corporate participants. This code essentially aimed to 
encourage transparency management of a company besides providing relevant 
information to the investors to enable them to guide the company's direction. This 
code can also serve as guidelines to the board of directors on how to manage the 
company based on their roles and responsibilities (Low, 2000: 438). 
 
The Bursa Malaysia and SC had gazetted new rules for the public listed 
companies. They were required to disclose their financial status, shareholders 
structure and loan position on a quarterly basis. A company's manager is 
subjected to penalty or jail sentence if they fail to comply with the rules. The 
government had granted a warrant amounting to US$100,000 to Malaysia 
Institute of Corporate Governance (MICG) to conduct research and training 
program in order to improve the corporate governance standard and quality (Das, 
2000: 19). 
 
In August 2000, Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group was established to 
encourage the company to comply with the principles of corporate governance 
and to improve the awareness among the minority shareholder about their rights 
and the appropriate methods to enforce their rights. Members of this committee 
were from the government fund institutions such as Employees Provident Funds 
(EPF), Armed Forces Fund Authority (LTAT), Pilgrims Fund Board (LUTH), 
Social Security Organization (SOCSO) and Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB) 
(Yusof Abu Othman, 2000).     
 
The undertaken reformation illustrated that the government and the private sector 
had put much effort in order to enhance the standard of Malaysian corporate 
governance. An investment bank, CLSA Emerging Market in collaboration with 
Asian Corporate Governance Association (ACGA) through their research 
regarding the Asian Corporate Governance, reported that Malaysia has achieved 
the highest score of 9.0 compared to other Asian countries in reforming their 
corporate rules and regulation (Halim, 2003). However, the same research also 
showed that the score for the enforcement of corporate rules and regulation was 
among the lowest (refer to Table 1). With a score of only 3.5, Malaysia was 
ranked 4th lowest position ahead of Indonesia, Philippines and Thailand. This 
scenario tells us that the law reforms and implementation are inconsistent.  
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Table 1 
Rank of Countries Based on Corporate Reforms and Enforcement 
 
Countries Laws and rules reforms  Enforcement 
Singapore 8.5 7.5 
Hong Kong 8.0 6.5 
India 8.0 6.0 
Taiwan 7.0 5.0 
Korea 7.0 3.5 
Malaysia 9.0 3.5 
Thailand 7.5 3.0 
China 5.0 4.0 
Philippines 6.5 2.0 
Indonesia 4.5 1.5 
 
Source: Amended from CLSA Emerging Market in Halim Wahab (2003) 
  
In Malaysia, it can be seen that the state intervention in the economy began in 
1970 when the government initiated the positive discrimination policy, i.e. the 
New Economic Policy (NEP).5 Under the NEP, government tried to groom 
Bumiputera entrepreneur groups in modern economic sector.6 Therefore, the 
trustee system7 was created to achieve NEP's overall mission. Public enterprise 
was among the first method introduced by the government to increase 
Bumiputera participation in the commercial trading sector. However, this method 
had actually initiated the relationship between business and politics. Initially, the 
state involvement was merely to act as the shareholder for the Bumiputera, but 
eventually become owners of companies or shareholders or investment proxy 
through companies owned by the ruling parties. 
 
                                                 
5  NEP was introduced with an objective to obtain national integration through poverty elimination 
and society restructuring to eliminate economic trademark by race. 
6  Government tried to achieve 30% Bumiputera ownership of the corporate sector. 
7  The trusteeship system refers to trusted individual or organization in implementing certain 
policy. According to Jomo et al. (1986: 5), there are two basic criteria in trustee strategy in 
Malaysia. Firstly, decision on budget allocation and resources and preferred investment were 
done according to rules and method determine by the trustee. Secondly, the power on economic 
resources is with the trustee and separated from the parties who owned it. There are two level of 
trusteeship. The first level is that small group of individuals who makes political decision. The 
second level is those superior officers and government servants who serve as the middlemen in 
implementing and controlling multiples projects and programs under the trustee system. Under 
the system, the level of poverty or wealth is very much dependent on decision made by the 
trustee and how the decision is derived. If the decision making process were done with efficiency 
and fairness, proper production and distribution can be obtained effectively compared to 
capitalism system and socialism system. See Gomez (1990) and Nor Azizah (2004). 
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Three companies were selected as indicators in this research. They are Perwaja, 
Renong and MAS. The context of discussion focuses on ownership and control as 
well as discordance rules and regulation governing these companies. Hence, this 
paper tries to demonstrate how the government and business work hand in hand 
to conceal the evidence of wrongdoing and malpractice.   
 
Perwaja was established in 1982 by HICOM Bhd., a company owned by the 
government in collaboration with a Japanese company, Nippon Steel Corporation 
to fulfill the government's mission in implementing the heavy industrial policy. 
This is an example where the government had direct interest, as shareholders in a 
company. On the other hand, Renong8 was known as United Malays National 
Organization (UMNO)'s investment company in the corporate sector. Renong 
became a successful conglomerate after Halim Saat,9 Daim's protégé took over its 
management. Halim has spurred UMNO's move in business (Yong, Wong, 
Chong, Lim, & Chan, 1991). Renong was awarded with many infrastructure 
development contracts by the state.10  Another similar case involved MAS, whose 
establishment and ownership are also related to the state.  MAS which started off 
as an airline company wholly owned by the government, was later sold to Bank 
Negara as a private entity. However, despite the transfer of ownership, the 
government still owned the "golden share",11 which bundles together with the 
veto power to influence MAS's decision making process. In 1993, Bank Negara 
sold MAS to Naluri Bhd. As the case of Renong, Naluri's owner, Tajudin Ramli 
was also Daim's protégé. The veto power of the government remained 
unchanged. 
 
The state ownership in all the three companies created close relationship between 
business and politics. According to Gomez (1990), this relationship can no longer 
split the business and politics as two different entities, but make them 
indispensable and dependable on each other.12 In our point of view, this 
relationship can easily cause fraud and corruption in the trustee system and offer 
much freedom to the businessman to act above the corporate law. 
                                                 
8 It started when Renong (after being taken over by Halim Saat) bought all Fleet Group assets 
from Fleet Holding (UMNO's investment company – refer Yong, Wong, Chong, Lim, & Chan 
(1991) via reverse takeover with RM1.226 billion shares issuance. Halim Saat admitted that he 
is an UMNO proxy in the business. See Gomez (1994: 117). 
9  Halim Saat was the director in several governments owned companies, i.e. Landmark Holdings 
and Paremba. He was also the director for several listed public companies where Daim's (the 
Minister of Finance at the time) family members were among the shareholders, i.e. Roxy, D&C 
Bank and Clod Storage (Gomez, 1990: 49–50).  
10  See Gomez & Jomo (1999: 97–98). 
11  See Lennane (1997: 26–30). 
12  Businessman needs politician's support for ease of being awarded with resources owned by the 
government. While politicians need businessmen support to fund their political campaigns 
during the election season to enable them to be reelected as representative in the government. 
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Since incorporated, Perwaja had not only failed to gain any profit but was 
involved in endless scandals and corruption.13 Within six years, it was knocking 
on bankruptcy's door.  Perwaja suffered losses of RM2.95 billion and at the same 
time owed banks another RM7 billion.  Perwaja was also facing colligations of 
corruption and mismanagement in tender and contract awarding.  For example, 
Mah Sun Company and its related companies were awarded with RM967 billion 
worth of contracts without any authorization from the board of directors.  
Another RM103 billion worth of contract were also awarded to the same 
company with no documents traced. Furthermore, doubtful trading transactions 
and payments were carried out to non-existing company, i.e. Frilsham 
Enterprise.14 Datuk Seri Anwar Ibrahim (Minister of Finance at that time) 
informed Parliament that Perwaja was insolvent.  However, no legal actions were 
taken against Perwaja until Eric Chia was arrested in Mac 2004.   Today, Perwaja 
is still in operation with fresh funds being injected by the government (Netto, 
2004). 
 
In another case, the problems happened in Renong has revealed the malpractice 
of corporate governance in Malaysia. The Asian Financial Crisis which led to 
Ringgit depreciation has further caused serious financial problem. Apart from 
this, it has also increased the amount of Renong accumulated debt between 
RM20–28 billion which constituted more than 5% of loans by Malaysian banking 
systems (Gomez, 2002: 102; Thomas, 2002: 154). Many economists were 
puzzled with this situation. The main issue was how did the company obtain such 
a large fund as their corporate loans? Did the board of directors and shareholders 
play a part in executing their rights to enable Renong to obtain such a big 
amount?  Had the loan process and procedure been simplified? According to 
Gomez (2002), those figures indicated that a significant amount of bank loans 
had been channeled to a selected minority. During the crisis, Halim, who owned 
not more than 78% of the company's equity tried to save it via restructuring 
process. He used his subsidiaries to pay Renong's debt15 but the minority 
shareholders were not pleased with his act as it was against their rights and 
interest and was a felony pertaining to corporate governance rules.16 Majority of 
                                                 
13  In 1986, Perwaja reported a loss exceeding RM131 million, due to internal management 
problems and currencies movement as a result of economic crisis, where Japanese Yen 
appreciated against Ringgit Malaysia. See Financial Times  (April 1, 2002). 
14  See Nor Azizah (2004). 
15  Halim bought Renong's shares via UEM, while PLUS issued RM17 billion of bonds at coupon 
rate of not less than 10% per annum, in order to settle Renong's debt amounting to RM8 billion 
in seven years. See Jayasankaran (2003). 
16  In November 1997, Halim sold 32.6% of Renong shares to UEM at RM3.24 per share, 35% 
higher than cost price of RM2.40 per share (Ranawana, 2000). According to Gomez (2001), this 
acquisition implemented partly through a RM800 million loan provided by government-owned 
and politically well-connected banks, upset UEM minority shareholder. Later, PLUS, a Renong 
subsidiary, was used by Halim to fund Renong's debts. See Nor Azizah (2004: 59–64). 
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analysts were of the view that this type of funding was ridiculous, as subsidiaries 
fund was not supposed to be utilized to bail out its parent's debt. 
 
Last but not least, MAS was also faced with internal management problems. Prior 
to the Asian Financial Crisis, MAS had already suffered huge debts caused by the 
new management under Tajudin Ramli. This had put MAS at risk during the 
crisis as all their transactions were done in US dollars. At the same time, Tajudin 
also had huge personal debts.17 However, the veto power of the government in 
MAS's management had limited plan for MAS to expand and revise funding 
strategies for its debts, i.e. decision on airlines destinations were subjected to 
government's decision and endorsement. At the time, the destinations decided by 
the government were not popular destinations or less concentrated areas, but 
MAS had to oblige and extend its services to comply with Malaysian foreign 
policy. This type of veto decision contributed to lower return for MAS compared 
to other air lines. Consequently, the Asian Financial Crisis affected both MAS and 
Tajudin badly due to the significant increase in debts.  MAS had sold nine of 
their aircrafts costing RM10 billion at a price of RM14 billion to pay Tajudin's 
personal debts (MASSA, April 17, 1999). By December 1999, Naluri's loans were 
RM888.25 billion causing the company to be deemed as unqualified to be in 
charge of MAS's operation anymore (Fauziah, 2000). 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
At this point, we can see that the states involvement in business had changed and 
therefore increased the roles of state in many different ways. First, the state at its 
capacity as the shareholders had the right to be informed about the business 
operation and plan of the company. They can accept or reject any proposals and 
plans as well as instruct the management of the company to pursue according to 
government's needs. Second, the state as the owner of the financial institutions18 
controlled the financial institutions that provided funds and working capitals. 
Third, the state as a ruler, can instruct any agency and government offices to 
process applications for contracts, loan tender, etc. from its wholly owned 
companies. The state , in the ruler's capacity is also the enforcer of any rules and 
legislation gazetted by the government. 
 
                                                 
17  Tajudin obtained personal loans amounting to RM1.8 billion from four banks to enable him to 
buy Bank Negara's share in MAS (Jayasankaran, 1999). 
18  Malayan Banking Berhad (MBB) and Bumiputra Commerce Berhad (BCB) are examples of 
financial institutions owned by the government. The government through Permodalan Nasional 
Berhad (PNB), chaired by the Prime Minister, controls MBB. Commerce-Asset Holdings, 
subsidiary of Renong Berhad, controls BCB.  
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These roles, which are conflicting with each other, had caused interruptions in the 
appropriate ownership and control practice.  This situation led to an imbalance 
condition between the owner and controller of the company, perhaps causing the 
misuse of government and financial institutions in the event where  
"check and balance" system was neglected.19  This scenario also showed that the 
balance of power within the state had shifted in favor of increasingly centralized 
executives. Hence, this situation conforms to Blair's (1995) model, which 
strongly emphasized the rights and power of the principle and its agent in 
company's management are still subjected to the degree of government 
intervention.  
 
Even though the Asian Financial Crisis is over and we had successfully overcome 
the situation, we can never let it happen again as such crisis will lead to a great 
loss of our resources in the long term. We learn from history that government's 
intervention in economy is essential as free market had failed to build up the 
conducive economic environment. However, the degree of government's 
intervention should be limited to certain extent, or else it could jeopardize the 
level of democratic practice by the key market players. The politics and business 
interest should be aligned in order to prevent any corporate misconduct, hence 
avoiding selected legal phenomena, which will eventually affect the government's 
credibility as the ruler.  
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